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ABSTRACT: The two health reform bills pending in Congress represent quite different 
understandings of what a health insurance exchange is, what it does, how it is organized, and how 
it functions. How those differences are resolved is likely to determine the extent to which the 
eventual exchanges accomplish their goals and whether they avoid the difficulties that have 
afflicted earlier attempts at creating and operating exchanges. This report describes design and 
function issues raised by exchanges, prior experience with exchanges, the provisions of the 
pending House and Senate bills that affect exchanges, and policy issues raised by the legislation. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
One of the least controversial features of the health care reform legislation 
currently before Congress is the health insurance exchange. The concept of the exchange 
has support across much of the political spectrum, and the final House and Senate bills 
both contain, and have always contained, an exchange. The apparent widespread 
agreement, however, conceals a deeper lack of consensus on how the exchange should be 
designed institutionally and how it should function. The absence of a vigorous debate 
about the exchange concept, moreover, has contributed to a lack of focus on the exact 
nature and function of an exchange. 
 
A health insurance exchange is basically an organized market for the purchase of 
health insurance. The exchange is intended to play a number of roles in health care 
reform. First, it is expected to be the locus of “managed competition” among health 
insurance plans. It is hoped that this competition will make health insurance more 
affordable and thus more accessible. Second, the exchange is expected to create a sizable 
risk pool that will allow insurance risk to be more efficiently managed, reducing the 
incidence of adverse selection (by the insured—see p. 27) and the practice of risk 
selection (by insurers). Third, it is hoped that the exchange will reduce administrative 
costs by simplifying marketing and eliminating risk-based underwriting. Fourth, the 
exchange offers the possibility of making health insurance markets more transparent and 
of facilitating consumer choice among health insurance plans by providing more and 
better information about health insurance options. Fifth, the exchange may play a 
regulatory role, helping to make insurers more accountable. In particular, it could serve as 
a forum for reallocating risk among insurers and for guaranteeing that those insurers sell 
comprehensive health coverage with manageable cost-sharing, that they market their 
plans fairly, and that they respond properly to consumer claims and complaints. Sixth, the 
exchange will likely play a role in facilitating other key features of the health care reform 
legislation, such as the payment of premium credits or perhaps even the imposition of the 
individual or employer mandates. 
 
Whether the exchange will effectively perform these functions, however, depends 
entirely on the institutions established to administer it; the functions, responsibilities, and 
authority it is afforded; its regulatory environment; and the structure of the markets in 
which it operates. We have, in fact, had a lot of experience with exchanges—also called 
purchasing cooperatives or health alliances—and much of that experience has been 
discouraging. In the past, exchanges have often had a difficult time attracting enough 
 v
members or insurers to function efficiently, and have become targets of adverse selection. 
They have rarely been able to achieve their promise of significantly reducing the cost of 
insurance premiums or increasing access to health care. With this in mind, Congress 
needs to be careful in its policy choices in order to optimize the chance of success. 
 
This paper first examines the role of the exchange in a reformed health care 
system, explores our experience with exchanges and what we can learn from it, describes 
the different approaches to exchange design and function taken by the House and Senate 
bills, and concludes with an examination of the policy issues raised by the pending 
legislation. The descriptions of the bills’ provisions are summarized in the table at the 
end of this section. 
 
The major policy issues that must be addressed in creating exchanges are: 
 
Should the exchange be established at the federal or at the state level? 
Insurance regulation has traditionally been a state function, and a number of states have 
had experience running exchanges. Establishing exchanges at the state level also would 
promote experimentation and responsiveness to localized concerns. On the other hand, 
health care reform is a national effort to create a nationwide reform. The Constitution 
does not permit Congress to “commandeer” the states to carry out the reform, and any 
attempt by the federal government to oversee state implementation of the reforms would 
be awkward at best, ineffectual at worst. The federal government has in fact had quite a 
lot of experience running exchanges like the Federal Employees Health Benefits 
Program. A national exchange could ensure uniform nationwide availability, with the 
capacity to assist those families that work or live in several states. There is also concern 
as to whether all states have the resources and willpower to be sufficiently aggressive in 
regulating insurers. A single national exchange with a local presence (perhaps through 
Social Security offices) is perhaps more likely to be implemented successfully. 
 
How can the plan be protected against adverse selection? 
The Achilles’ heel of many earlier exchanges has been adverse selection—exchanges 
tend to attract (or to have dumped upon them) sicker and more costly enrollees. The 
obvious solution to this problem is to prohibit those individuals or groups who are 
eligible for insurance sold through the exchange from buying insurance anywhere else. 
Measures can be taken, however, to limit adverse selection even if insurance continues to 
be sold outside the exchange. First, exchanges should be opened up to all individuals and 
to groups large enough to give the exchange a viable risk pool. Second, plans inside and 
outside the exchange should have to play by the same rules and charge the same 
 vi
premiums. Third, there should be implementation of risk-adjustment or reinsurance 
schemes covering insurers inside and outside the exchange to assure that plans attracting 
low risks compensate those that attract high risks. Finally, employers and insurers can be 
regulated to discourage them from steering bad risks into exchange plans. 
 
How can the exchange contribute to standardization and transparency? 
Exchanges can facilitate consumer choice by requiring all insurers that market policies 
within the exchange to cover the same essential benefit package and to provide insurance 
in standardized tiers of coverage for easy comparison. Exchanges also can require 
insurers to make available to consumers standardized information about a whole range of 
plan features and limitations (such as benefit coverage, cost-sharing obligations, 
exclusions, network providers, out-of-network costs, and information about consumer 
complaints, disenrollments, and satisfaction) to assist consumers in identifying and 
purchasing the coverage they need and can afford. This information should be made 
available in plain language and in a culturally and linguistically appropriate manner. 
Finally, exchanges should make available financial information concerning plans such as 
medical loss ratios or justifications offered for premium increases, in order to improve the 
public accountability of insurers. 
 
What can an exchange do to reduce administrative costs? 
One of the promises of exchanges is that they can reduce the costs of administering 
health insurance. That promise can be fulfilled if an exchange reduces the costs of 
marketing insurance and of enrolling members and eliminates the cost of risk 
underwriting. Another significant cost-cutting opportunity lies in the reduction or 
elimination of brokerage commissions, as the role of brokers in the individual market 
should be reduced or eliminated by the exchange. To succeed at reducing administrative 
costs by eliminating duplication of effort, however, the exchange needs to provide 
insurers with a large enough group of exchange-based enrollees so that the insurer can 
comfortably cease providing itself to those enrollees the services the exchange offers. 
Finally, a national exchange would save money by avoiding the duplication of functions 
that state exchanges will create. 
 
What avenues should the exchanges provide for appeals and judicial review? 
Exchanges will make a host of legal determinations, such as deciding which insurers, 
individuals, and employers can participate in the exchange. Exchanges may also play a 
role in deciding eligibility for subsidies or compliance with individual or employer 
mandates. Insurers that participate in the exchange will, of course, adjudicate claims and 
 vii
respond to grievances. Procedures need to be in place for providing administrative and, 
when necessary, judicial review for these determinations. 
 
How can the exchanges control cost? 
It is hoped that exchanges will not only facilitate access to health care but also help 
control growth in health care costs. The primary route through which they may do so is 
“managed competition” among insurers as standardization and transparency of offerings 
drives insurers toward price competition. The presence of a public plan in the market 
could in particular encourage private insurers to offer more competitive prices. An 
exchange also could offer insurers a large number of purchasers and perhaps receive 
discounts in return. Finally, an exchange could negotiate with insurers to bring down 
premiums or refuse to permit those that unreasonably or excessively increase premiums 
to participate in the exchange. Cost control in the exchange is particularly important 
because many of its participants are going to be lower- or middle-income Americans who 
were previously unable to afford health insurance, and much of the cost of their insurance 
is going to be borne by the taxpayers through premium and cost-sharing subsidies. All 
available approaches to controlling costs should be pursued. 
 
Over the next days and weeks, Congress will finalize legislation that will 
significantly change the way in which we finance health care in the United States. The 
health insurance exchange concept will almost certainly play a role in this reform. The 
exchange holds real promise as a tool of health policy, but as is almost always the case in 
public policy, the devil will be in the details of design and function. The two bills enacted 
by the House and Senate contain a host of good ideas that Congress can work with in 
putting together a final bill. There is, however, much that could be improved. It is to be 
hoped that this analysis will prove useful in the pursuit of that goal. 
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HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES IN HEALTH CARE REFORM: 
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of the health insurance exchange is found in both HR 3962, adopted in 
November by the House, and in HR 3590, the bill adopted by the Senate in December, 
and has indeed been found in every earlier bill passed by a House or Senate committee in 
the 2009 health reform campaign. It has, however, provoked surprisingly little debate or 
even analysis. Indeed, it is one of the least controversial, even least conspicuous features 
of the health reform legislation. The exchange concept has been endorsed by policy 
advocates across a broad range of the political spectrum. An insurance exchange will 
almost certainly be part of the final 2009-2010 legislation, if health reform is finally 
adopted into law. 
 
A health insurance exchange is basically an organized market for health 
insurance. Nevertheless, the term “health insurance exchange” is not clearly defined; 
indeed the vision of what an exchange is and how it would function varies significantly 
from proposal to proposal. An exchange could potentially play a major role in making 
health insurance more affordable and accessible, perhaps even in improving the quality of 
care. Competition among insurers structured through an exchange could move insurers 
away from competition that is based on attracting the best risk and toward competition 
based on price and quality. This could in turn limit premium growth (and thereby overall 
cost growth), cut administrative costs, reduce risk selection and smooth out risk 
distribution, and improve the quality of insurance coverage, perhaps even of health care 
itself. An exchange could ideally provide standardization of insurance products, thus 
improving coverage transparency and comparability of prices. But, depending on how it 
is designed and implemented, an exchange could have very little effect on the health care 
system, and could even increase cost. 
 
The exchange concept has a long history in health care reform efforts. The 
intellectual history of the exchange goes back to the concept of “managed competition,” 
credited to Alain Enthoven’s work in the late 1970s.1 The “health alliance,” an ambitious 
form of exchange, was at the heart of the Clinton Health Security Act.2 During the 1990s, 
health insurance purchasing cooperatives were encouraged by legislation in a number of 
states and implemented by business and community groups in others, although many 
have since failed. The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) and the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CALPERS) are often cited as long-
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standing and more or less successful examples of insurance exchanges, and exchange-like 
arrangements exist in the public employee benefit programs of many states.3 The 
Medicare Advantage program and Medicare Part D include some elements of a health 
care exchange (choice among multiple plans), although not others (a common enrollment 
portal). The Massachusetts Connector is the most recent, and to date most successful, 
attempt to establish an exchange at the state level. Utah has also recently begun to 
implement an exchange.4 Finally, The health care systems of other countries, notably the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and Germany, have exchange-like features, including 
standardized benefit packages and risk adjustment among insurers..5
 
This paper first examines the different ways in which exchanges could be 
designed in a reformed health care system and the different roles that they could play. 
The paper next briefly explores experiences with exchanges and what we can learn from 
them. It then describes the different approaches taken by the House and Senate bills to 
exchange design and function. The paper then concludes with an examination of the 
policy issues raised by the pending legislation. 
 
EXCHANGE DESIGN AND FUNCTION ISSUES 
Assuming that an exchange or multiple exchanges are part of final reform legislation, 
Congress, and ultimately the states or a federal agency, will need to make choices with 
respect to a number of design issues. 
 
The first of these is, who will be covered by the exchange? Several different 
markets currently exist for insurance, and exchanges could be limited to one or, 
alternatively, could serve several of these markets. Exchanges could limit their 
enrollment to the nongroup market. They could additionally be opened to employees who 
would otherwise be covered by the small-group market (groups of up to 25 or 50, for 
example) with employees choosing among plans offered through the exchange and 
employers contributing to cover part or all of the premium. By further extension, 
exchanges could cover members of large groups up to a given size, or indeed all insureds. 
 
The proportion of insureds covered by the exchange expands dramatically if large 
groups are covered, because, although most employers are small businesses, most 
employees work for larger employers.6 The Clinton Health Security Act Health Alliances 
covered all insureds except those who worked for employers with 5,000 or more 
employees or who were members of multiemployer union plans with 5,000 or more 
members, and thus covered a much larger proportion of the population than would be 
 2
covered under current proposals, which are, initially at least, limited to the nongroup and 
small-group markets.7
 
A related issue is the extent to which the exchange will be the exclusive gateway 
to purchasing insurance for those persons who qualify to enroll in it. Here there are 
several possibilities. All insureds in a particular market could be required to purchase 
insurance through the exchange. Pre-existing insurance policies could be grandfathered in 
and their owners excused from exchange participation. The exchange could be 
nonexclusive in the group market; that is, new group policies could be sold outside the 
exchange. The exchange could be nonexclusive even in the nongroup market, thus 
permitting insurance sold outside the exchange to compete with the exchange in all 
markets. Finally, insurance could be sold both inside and outside the exchange, but 
premium subsidies could be available only within the exchange, thus limiting the 
subsidized population to the exchange. 
 
Exchanges can also serve a range of functions.8 An exchange could conceivably 
be nothing more than a Web site where individuals compare and purchase health 
insurance policies. At the other end of the spectrum, it could be an active participant in 
the health insurance market, bargaining aggressively to reduce health care costs or 
imposing regulatory cost controls. Functions that could conceivably be performed by a 
health insurance exchange include: 
 
• Organizing the market by making it more transparent and improving comparability 
of plans. Exchanges could be used to standardize insurance product descriptions 
and to facilitate price comparison by grouping policies in product tiers in terms of 
their actuarial value or cost-sharing limits (e.g., platinum, gold, silver, bronze). 
• Facilitating purchasing, and thereby simplifying choice. Individuals could 
actually purchase insurance through the exchange with their own funds or 
employer contributions. Allowing employers to pay premium payments through 
the exchange for their employees could expand employee choice, facilitate 
portability (since employees could keep their policy even as they changed 
employers), and permit multiple employers to make contributions for the benefit 
of part-time employees. An exchange could reduce or eliminate the role and 
commissions of insurance brokers and agents, currently a major expense in the 
nongroup or small-group market. Exchanges could also serve as clearinghouses 
for public insurance coverage in general, directing eligible individuals who come 
to the exchange to other programs, such as the Medicaid, CHIP, or even  
Medicare programs. 
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• Increasing the size of the insurance purchasing pool, spreading risk more broadly 
and reducing risk selection. 
• Regulating health insurance coverage. Exchanges could be used to impose on 
participating insurers regulatory requirements not imposed on insurers generally, 
by, for example, defining essential benefits that must be covered or limiting cost-
sharing. Exchanges could also require reporting, collect data from insurers, and 
monitor regulatory compliance. 
• Facilitating the imposition of individual mandates. One of the functions of the 
Massachusetts Connector is to define “creditable coverage,” a minimum benefit 
standard that must be met to fulfill the requirements of the individual mandate.9 
The Connector also defines “affordability” for determining whether an individual 
is excused from meeting the mandate. If a national individual mandate is adopted 
with an affordability exception, compliance could be monitored and exceptions 
could be granted through the exchange. 
• Facilitating the use of health insurance premium subsidies. This again is a 
function of the Massachusetts Connector. Eligibility for subsidies can be 
determined through the exchange, which can then couple the subsidies with 
premium payments provided by individuals and employers to pay for insurance 
• Reallocating risk among insurers. The exchange can be used as a mechanism for 
prospectively adjusting premium payments to health insurers (or for moving 
money among insurers retroactively) to reward insurers who take on high-risk 
individuals at the expense of insurers who attract low-risk individuals. 
• Selecting high-value insurers. An exchange could (as Massachusetts does) allow 
only a limited number of insurers to offer policies in the exchange and, in 
addition, could permit insurers to offer only a limited range of policies. This 
would increase comparability and could allow the exchange to select insurers and 
policies that offer the best value. Insurers not selected to offer a policy could 
either be barred from the nongroup/small-group market or be allowed to offer 
policies outside the exchange (but without access to public affordability 
subsidies). 
• Negotiating with insurers. An exchange could go further and negotiate directly 
with insurers, allowing only those with whom they had concluded satisfactory 
negotiations to offer policies through the exchange. 
• Regulating insurance premiums. An exchange could impose price controls or 
mandatory medical expense ratios on insurers, allowing only insurers that comply 
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with regulatory requirements to sell through the exchange (or in the small- or 
nongroup market). 
• Facilitating research. An exchange would be ideally situated to collect data from 
participating insurers; the data could then be used by researchers to improve our 
understanding of health insurance and health care financing and utilization 
 
Another important decision that will need to be made regarding exchanges 
concerns the level of government at which they are created and the authority under which 
they operate. Exchanges could be established at the national, regional, state, or substate 
level. Exchanges could be created by federal law, by state law, or by private concerns. 
Congress could establish national exchanges directly through federal law. Alternatively, 
Congress could adopt a law requiring the states to establish exchanges under federal 
oversight, funded in whole or in part by federal funds, with a federal fall-back program 
for states that failed to establish viable exchanges. Either federal or state exchanges could 
contract with private entities to perform some of their functions. Exchanges could 
supplement existing federal or state insurance regulators or take over some or all of their 
functions. Finally, private exchanges could be formed by employer coalitions, nonprofit 
organizations, or even for-profit firms. 
 
EXPERIENCE WITH EXCHANGES 
Previous experience with exchanges has on the whole been discouraging.10 Efforts by the 
states to establish open exchanges have largely failed. State-sponsored exchanges in 
California, Florida, and Texas enjoyed initial success, but were not able to sustain it and 
eventually closed.11 The most successful public exchanges have been the Federal 
Employee Health Benefits Program; state pension programs, like CALPERS, or state 
employee benefit programs; and the Massachusetts Connector (which is still perhaps too 
new to pronounce an unqualified success). These exchanges, however, have not been able 
to keep cost growth significantly below that experienced generally in the private market. 
A few private purchasing cooperatives have also enjoyed some success in increasing 
employee choice for small-group plans, but likewise have not had a significant effect  
on cost.12
 
One purported advantage of an exchange is that it can create a large risk pool, 
which should be more attractive to insurers than an atomistic market because it is less 
vulnerable to adverse selection. A second advantage is that an exchange can save on 
administrative costs both by reducing marketing costs and by creating economies of 
scale. A third is that an exchange should be able to increase consumer clout by offering a 
large group to insurers. All of these factors should reduce the cost of insurance, thus 
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expanding access if individuals and employers who have stayed out of the market find 
insurance purchased through the exchange to be affordable. 
 
With rare exceptions, the cost reductions promised by risk pooling have not yet 
been borne out in the experience of exchanges.13 Most exchanges have covered only a 
small share of the potential market and have themselves become victims of risk selection. 
Insurers that have the option of selling outside the exchange have found exchanges 
unattractive because they tend to include higher-risk individuals and groups and because 
insurers prefer to control their own relationships with employers. Insurers have also 
found insuring employer groups through exchanges to be disadvantageous because 
employees are allowed to pick among insurers and plans rather than all being steered to 
one insurer, and because employees can change insurers easily at open enrollment 
periods. Insurers have often continued to duplicate functions preformed by the exchange, 
such as marketing and enrollment, because the exchange does not provide a large enough 
share of their enrollees for them to cease performing the functions for their exchange 
members. When exchanges have tried to limit the commissions of agents, who largely 
duplicate the functions of the exchange, agents have simply steered applicants elsewhere. 
Exchanges have also rarely reached a size that would allow them to reduce administrative 
costs. Indeed, they have sometimes duplicated functions already provided by insurers, 
employers, or agents, thus increasing costs. Finally, exchanges have not become large 
enough to impose competitive pressure on the outside market. Because exchanges have 
failed to reduce costs, they have also failed to increase access to insurance. 
 
This is not to say that experience with exchanges has been wholly negative. 
Where they have survived, exchanges have increased the choice of insurers available to 
their participants, and this has been valued by consumers. The FEHBP remains an 
example of the potential of exchanges—it has maintained good benefits and a wide 
choice of plans for participants and has been reasonably successful in controlling costs.14 
Nevertheless, experience to date with health insurance exchanges gives little reason to 
believe that the exchange in itself is a panacea for our cost, access, or quality deficits. 
The model as it has existed must be improved upon. This is the task of health reform. 
 
HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES IN THE PROPOSED HEALTH  
REFORM LEGISLATION 
As noted at the outset, exchanges play a key role in the bills passed by the House and 
Senate. How do these bills envision the goal of exchanges? What functions do they 
assign to them? At what level would they require exchanges to operate? What would be 
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the respective roles of the federal and state governments in their operation? How does the 
proposed legislation attempt to avoid the pitfalls of previous exchanges? 
 
The text that follows describes the provisions of H.R. 3962, the health reform bill 
that has passed the House, and H.R. 3590, the bill that has passed the Senate, in each case 
incorporating all amendments. Section numbers in the notes refer either to the section 
number of the bill in which the language is found or, where it is more specific, to the 
section number in amendments or additions to a pre-existing law created by the bill. The 
questions are intended to illuminate the different approaches taken by the two bills. 
 
1. Does the exchange exist at the federal, the state, or some other level? 
 
HOUSE. The exchange operates at the national level, established within a new Health 
Choices Administration.15 The Commissioner of the HCA can, however, permits 
individual states or groups of states to administer an exchange within their territory in 
place of the national exchange if specific requirements are met, subject to revocation if 
the state ceases to meet the requirements of the bill.16 Even if the HCA delegates 
exchange authority to a state, the Commissioner retains enforcement authority and can 
further specify functions retained by the Commissioner and not delegated.17
 
SENATE. The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is 
responsible for issuing regulations to set standards for the operation of American Health 
Benefit Exchanges (“exchanges”) for individuals and for the Small Business Health 
Options Program exchanges (“SHOP exchanges”).18 HHS will also promulgate 
regulations for implementing the insurance reforms found in the legislation, the offering 
of qualified health plans through the exchanges, the establishment of reinsurance and 
risk-adjustment mechanisms, and other regulatory requirements.19 States may then elect 
to adopt, no later than January 1, 2014, the federal standards into their own laws or to 
adopt standards that HHS finds to be equivalent.20 Exchanges must be administered by 
governmental agencies or nonprofit entities established by a state.21 A state may elect to 
combine its exchange and SHOP exchange into a single exchange.22 With the approval of 
HHS, states may participate in regional exchanges or establish subsidiary exchanges 
serving geographically distinct parts of the state.23 States may also contract with “eligible 
entities,” (private entities with relevant experience that are not insurers or related to an 
insurer or a state Medicaid agency) to carry out some exchange responsibilities.24
 
If a state chooses not to establish an exchange or if HHS determines on or before 
January 1, 2013, that the state has failed to take the actions necessary to implement the 
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requirements imposed by the reform law, HHS itself will establish an exchange or 
contract with a nonprofit entity to do so.25 HHS will also directly enforce the exchange 
law in states that fail to take these actions.26
 
The Senate bill provides two other options that states may choose. For plan years 
beginning in 2017, states may apply to HHS for a waiver, for up to five years, of the 
requirement that they establish an exchange (as well as other requirements of the 
legislation). A state may be granted such a waiver if HHS determines that the proposed 
state waiver program offers benefit coverage that is as comprehensive, cost-sharing that 
is as affordable, and coverage of as many people as what the reforms found in the bill 
would accomplish, and does so without increasing the federal deficit.27 The state must 
also meet public notice, comment, and reporting requirements. Under the second option, 
states can, with HHS permission, create a “basic health plan” to provide one or more 
standard health plans to uninsured households under 200 percent of the poverty level. The 
state would receive a federal payment of 95 percent of what would otherwise have been 
provided for premium tax credits and cost-sharing reduction payments.28
 
2. What are the role and duties of the exchange? 
 
HOUSE. The exchange must (1) establish standards for, accept bids from, and negotiate 
and enter into contracts with qualified health benefit plans, (2) facilitate outreach and 
enrollment, (3) establish a risk-pooling mechanism, (4) establish consumer protections,29 
and (5) administer the bill’s premium subsidies.30 The Commissioner is responsible for 
soliciting bids and negotiating contracts with qualified insurance providers that offer 
plans through the exchange.31 The Commissioner will deny requests from plans for 
premiums and premium increases deemed to be excessive.32
 
SENATE. An exchange must (1) make available qualified health plans to qualified 
individuals and employers (and cannot make available a plan that is not a qualified health 
plan),33 (2) implement procedures for certification, recertification, and decertification of 
health plans as qualified health plans,34 (3) provide a toll-free hot line for consumer 
assistance, (4) maintain a Web site with standardized comparative information on plans, 
(5) rate plans in accordance with criteria developed by HHS, (6) present information on 
health plans using a standardized format developed by HHS, (7) inform individuals about 
eligibility requirements for Medicaid, CHIP, or other state programs and help enroll 
eligible individuals in those plans as appropriate, (8) help establish eligibility for 
premium tax credits and cost-sharing reduction payments,35 (9) certify that individuals 
are exempt from the individual responsibility mandate if no insurance is affordable to 
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them or if they meet other exemption requirements, (10) inform the IRS of the identities 
of individuals who are exempt from the individual mandate, employers whose employees 
are receiving premium tax credits because those employers did not make affordable or 
adequate coverage available, and individuals who change employers or cease to obtain 
coverage through the exchange who had not obtained affordable or adequate coverage 
through their employer, (11) provide employers with the names of employees who cease 
to obtain coverage under a qualified health plan during the plan year, and (12) establish a 
navigator program to help educate and inform the public about the availability of 
qualified health plans, premium assistance, and consumer assistance and assist with 
enrollment.36 Finally, exchanges are responsible for consulting with consumers, 
individuals, and entities with experience in facilitating enrollment, small businesses and 
the self-employed, state Medicaid offices, and advocates for hard-to-reach populations as 
they carry out their duties.37
 
3. Who can buy insurance through an exchange? 
 
HOUSE. Individuals who don’t have employer or public coverage and employees of 
employers with up to 25 employees in 2013 and 50 employees in 2014, and employers of 
100 or larger if permitted by the Commissioner in 2015 and after.38 If an employer offers 
insurance through an exchange, the employer pays its share of the premiums through the 
exchange and the employees may enroll in any qualified insurer.39 Individuals who enroll 
in a qualified health benefits plan through an exchange may continue as long as they are 
enrolled in an exchange-participating plan, and employers who enroll their employees 
through an exchange may continue to do so regardless of later growth.40 Noncitizens are 
not barred from the exchange. 
 
SENATE. “Qualified individuals” and “qualified employers” may purchase insurance 
through an exchange.41 A qualified individual may enroll in any qualified health plan, 
while an employee may enroll in any qualified health plan in the tier of coverage chosen 
by his or her employer.42 A qualified individual is a nonincarcerated resident of a state 
who seeks to enroll in a qualified health plan in the individual market.43 A qualified 
employer is a small employer that chooses to make all of its full-time employees eligible 
for one or more qualified health plans offered through the exchange.44 “Small employer” 
is defined as an employer with an average of one to 100 employees on business days, 
although the state can, prior to 2016, define a small employer as having fewer than 51 
employees.45 Beginning in 2017, states may open their exchanges to larger groups, 
although health insurance issuers are not required to issue policies to larger groups.46 
Only United States citizens and legal residents can be treated as qualified individuals and 
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purchase qualified health plans through the exchange.47 The federal government can only 
offer members of Congress and full- and part-time staff of their official offices health 
insurance through the exchange. 48
 
4. Can insurance policies be sold outside the exchange? 
 
HOUSE. Only grandfathered policies can be sold to individuals outside the exchange.49 
Individuals can add family members to grandfathered policies, but the terms of the 
grandfathered policies cannot change except as required by law, and insurers cannot raise 
premiums on grandfathered policies unless they do so for all enrollees in the same risk 
group at the same rate.50 Employers can purchase qualified health plans outside the 
exchange for employees,51 and may retain grandfathered coverage free from the 
requirements of the new bill through 2017.52
 
SENATE. Individuals and groups may retain existing group health plans and insurance 
coverage policies, and most of the requirements of the bill do not apply to grandfathered 
health plans.53 Family members and new employees can be added to grandfathered health 
plans.54 The bill does not specify to what extent changes can be made in a health plan 
before it ceases to be grandfathered. 
 
Both an individual and a group health insurance market will continue to exist outside the 
exchange.55 Qualified individuals cannot be restricted to insurance plans offered in the 
exchange.56 The exchange and qualified health plans cannot penalize individuals for 
transferring to employment-based coverage or other forms of coverage outside the 
exchange.57 Health insurance issuers must, however, treat all individual enrollees in their 
plans (inside and outside the exchange), other than enrollees in grandfathered plans, as a 
single pool and all enrollees in the small group market (other than grandfathered 
enrollees) as a single pool, or, if the state elects, treat members of both pools as a single 
pool.58 State benefit requirements also continue to apply outside the exchange.59 Issuers 
of qualified health plans must agree to charge the same premium rate for a plan both 
inside and outside the exchange.60
 
5. How does the bill standardize and regulate health plans that are available through  
the exchange? 
 
HOUSE. Benefit plans must be structured to fit into one of four tiers: basic, enhanced, 
premium, and premium plus.61 The tiers are defined in terms of actuarial value as 
compared to a reference plan with the essential benefit package and without cost-
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sharing.62 The basic plan must cover 70 percent of the actuarial value of the benefits 
offered under the reference benefits package, the enhanced plan 85 percent and the 
premium plan 95 percent.63 Premium plus plans may offer extra benefits. All insurers 
must offer a basic plan. If insurers offer a basic plan, they may offer an enhanced plan. If 
they offer an enhanced plan, they may offer a premium plan. If they offer a premium 
plan, they may offer a premium plus plan.64
 
Qualified health benefit plans, both inside and outside the exchange, must meet a 
number of other requirements, some of which go into effect in 2010, others when the 
reforms are fully implemented in 2013. The immediate reforms include: 
• medical loss ratios limited to 85 percent65 
• a prohibition on rescission except on clear and convincing evidence, with 
opportunity for independent external review66 
• review of premiums67 
• an opportunity for extension of coverage to dependents under age 27 with no 
other health insurance coverage68 
• limitations on pre-existing condition exclusions and a prohibition on treating acts 
of domestic violence as a pre-existing condition69 
• required coverage of treatment for children with deformities70 
• elimination of lifetime dollar limits on coverage71 
• a prohibition on group plans reducing postretirement health benefits72 
 
Most of these reforms become permanent after the exchanges are established in 
2013. Additional permanent reforms include: 
• a prohibition against pre-existing condition exclusions73 
• a requirement of guaranteed issue and renewal74 
• insurance rating rules that permit only variations based on age (2:1), geographic 
area, and family category75 
• a prohibition against discrimination in benefits, including a mental heath and 
substance abuse disorder parity requirement76 
• a network adequacy requirement77 
• a requirement of 90 days’ notice of changes in coverage or cost-sharing78 
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• a requirement of timely payment of claims79 
• application of standards for coordination and subrogation of benefits and 
administrative simplification80 
• a requirement of dissemination of advance care planning information81 
 
All qualified health benefit plans, inside or outside the exchange, must cover 
essential services, limit cost-sharing (with no cost-sharing for preventive services), 
exclude annual or lifetime limits, and assure network adequacy.82 The essential benefit 
package must cover hospitalization; outpatient care (including emergency department 
services); professional services; services, equipment, and supplies incident to 
professional services; prescription drugs; rehabilitative and habilitative services; mental 
health and substance use disorder services; preventive services; maternity care; well-baby 
and well-child care and oral health, vision and hearing services, equipment, and supplies 
for children; and durable medical equipment, prosthetics, and orthotics and related 
supplies.83 The essential benefit plan is to be established by HHS upon the 
recommendation of a public/private Health Benefits Advisory Committee.84 If plans do 
not offer an adequate provider network, cost-sharing for out-of-network providers cannot 
exceed that for in-network providers.85
 
Plans marketed within the exchange (and plans marketed outside the exchange to 
the extent required by the Commissioner) must also comply with fair marketing, fair 
grievance and appeal, and transparency standards.86 Exchanges can also market insurance 
plans that are made available through interstate compacts or from health insurance 
cooperatives.87 Exchanges may make available insurance plans that cover abortions, but 
are not required to do so. 
 
SENATE. The Senate bill distinguishes among four levels of coverage based on actuarial 
value, with an additional catastrophic policy.88 The bronze-level plan has to provide 
benefits actuarially equivalent to 60 percent of the full actuarial value of benefits offered 
under the plan, the silver-level plan 70 percent, the gold-level 80 percent, and the 
platinum-level 90 percent.89 Catastrophic policies are available only for persons under 
age 30 or for those who cannot otherwise find affordable coverage or who would suffer a 
hardship in buying other coverage.90 Catastrophic plans must cover three primary care 
visits a year and preventive care, but otherwise the plan can impose a deductible at the 
maximum out-of-pocket level described below.91
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Exchanges may offer only qualified health plans,92 and premium assistance tax 
credits can be used only for qualified health plans.93 Exchanges may certify as qualified 
only those health plans that meet the requirements of the statute, and only if the exchange 
“determines that making available such health plan through such Exchange is in the 
interests of the qualified individuals and qualified employers in the State or States in 
which such Exchange operates.”94 An exchange cannot exclude a plan because the plan is 
a fee-for-service plan or because the plan “provides treatments necessary to prevent 
patients’ deaths in circumstances the Exchange determines are inappropriate or too 
costly.”95 Exchanges cannot impose premium cost controls, but they must require plans 
seeking certification to submit and post on their Web sites information justifying a 
premium increase prior to implementing the increase and must take excessive or 
unjustified premium increases into account in determining whether to make a health plan 
available through the exchange.96 Exchanges may also offer interstate and multistate 
plans, as well as plans offered by cooperatives and “qualified direct primary care medical 
home plans.”97
 
Qualified health plans must comply with all of the requirements in the bill that 
apply to health plans generally, as described below. Qualified health plans must 
additionally offer the essential benefit package described below, be licensed in each state 
in which they offer coverage, agree to offer at least one plan at the silver and one at the 
gold level, charge the same premium for the plan both inside and outside the exchange, 
and comply with other HHS regulations.98 States may prohibit exchange plans from 
covering abortions.99
 
In addition to these requirements, the Senate bill also instructs HHS to adopt 
regulations establishing certain criteria for the exchanges to use in certifying qualified 
health plans, namely that a plan will: 
• meet marketing requirements prohibiting marketing practices and benefit designs 
that have the effect of discouraging high-risk enrollees 
• ensure a sufficient number of in-network providers and provide information on 
the availability of providers in and out of network 
• include essential community providers that serve low-income, medically 
underserved individuals 
• be accredited based on HEDIS data and CAHPS patient experience surveys by an 
accreditation agency recognized by HHS 
• implement a quality-improvement strategy 
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• use a uniform enrollment form 
• use the standard benefit form (described below) for presenting health benefit 
options 
• provide quality-measure performance data to enrollees and prospective 
enrollees100 
• implement activities to reduce disparities in health and health care101 
 
Qualified health plans are required to implement strategies for rewarding quality 
through market-based incentives. The plan should use a payment structure that provides 
incentives for: 
• improving health outcomes through quality reporting, case management, care 
coordination, chronic disease management, medication and care compliance 
initiatives, and the use of medical homes 
• implementation of activities to prevent hospital readmissions 
• programs that improve patient safety and reduce medical errors, including  
the use of best clinical practices, evidence-based medicine, and health  
information technology 
• implementation of wellness and health promotion activities102 
 
Beginning in 2015, qualified health plans may contract with hospitals of more than 50 
beds only if those hospitals have implemented a patient safety evaluation system and 
comprehensive patient discharge program.103
 
6. If insurance policies can be sold outside the exchange, are they subject to the same 
regulations that govern policies sold within the exchange? 
 
HOUSE. Individual health insurance cannot be sold outside the exchange. Health 
insurance can, however, be sold to groups outside the exchange. The consumer 
protections provided by sections 231, 232, and 233 dealing with marketing, grievances 
and appeals, and disclosure and transparency are applied to plans outside the exchange 
only to the extent determined by the Commissioner.104 Certain requirements, such as 
reporting required data, providing affordable premiums, implementing affordability 
credits, accepting all enrollments through the exchange (subject to capacity limits), 
participating in risk pooling, covering essential community providers, providing 
culturally and linguistically appropriate services, and allowing providers to contract with 
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exchange-participating plans, also apply only within the exchange and do not apply to 
non-exchange insurers.105
 
SENATE. Unlike the House bill, the Senate bill recognizes a number of categories of 
health insurance to which different requirements apply. Individuals are required under 
§5000A(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, added by section 1501 of the Senate bill, to 
have “minimum essential coverage.” Minimum essential coverage is defined, in turn, as 
including public insurance (such as Medicare and Medicaid), “an eligible employer-
sponsored plan,” a “health plan offered in the individual market in the state,” or a 
grandfathered plan.106 (“Eligible employer-sponsored” coverage is defined as including 
all employee benefit plans.)107
 
Subtitles A and C of Title I of the Senate bill add a number of requirements to Part A of 
Title XXVII of the Public Health Services Act that apply to all insured health plans, 
whether or not sold through the exchange, including provisions that: 
• ban lifetime or annual dollar limits on coverage108 
• prohibit rescissions except for fraud109 
• require coverage of preventive health services without cost-sharing110 
• extend coverage for single dependents to age 26111 
• require the use of standardized explanations of coverage documents and 
definitions (see below)112 
• require reporting on quality-of-care, patient safety, and wellness and prevention 
initiatives113 
• report medical loss ratios and provide refunds to plan members if MLRs are less 
than 80 percent in the large-group market or 85 percent in the small-group market 
(unless higher MLRs are required by a state or lower MLRs are established  
by HHS)114 
• provide internal and external review115 
• require all health plans and insurers to cover emergency services without prior 
authorization or additional out-of-network cost-sharing, to permit pediatricians to 
be designated as primary care providers for children, and to permit women in 
plans that cover obstetrical and gynecological care to have direct access to 
obstetricians and gynecologists116 
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• require plans to allow their members to participate in approved clinical trials 
relating to the prevention, detection, or treatment of cancer or other life-
threatening diseases and to cover the routine patient costs of trial participation117 
• permit premium variation based only on age (3:1), geographic region, individual 
or family coverage, or tobacco use (1.5:1) (prohibiting rating based on health 
status and limiting rating based on other factors)118 
• guarantee issue and renewability of coverage119 
• prohibit pre-existing conditions exclusions or underwriting based on health status120 
• prohibit discrimination against providers or individuals121 
• prohibit waiting periods longer than 90 days122 
 
Some of these requirements apply to group health plans (i.e., ERISA plans) and to 
health insurance issuers in the individual and group market, i.e., all health insurance plans 
except for grandfathered plans.123 Others, however, apply only to insured individual or 
group plans or to plans in the individual or small-group market, and some explicitly do 
not apply to self-insured plans. 
 
Most importantly, the provision requiring essential benefits applies only to issuers 
in the individual and small-group market (including, however, non-grandfathered plans 
inside and outside the exchange).124 Essential health benefits include “at least” 
ambulatory patient services, emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn 
care, mental health and substance use disorder treatment, prescription drugs, 
rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, laboratory services, prevention and 
wellness services, chronic disease management, and pediatric services including oral and 
vision care.125 The scope of essential health benefits is supposed to be equal to the scope 
of those provided under the typical employer plan.126
 
The bill requires HHS to define the essential benefits package. The definition of 
essential benefits must ensure that benefits are balanced appropriately among the listed 
categories; that coverage decisions, reimbursement rates, incentive programs, and benefit 
design do not discriminate on the basis of age, disability, or expected length of life; that 
benefits take into account the health needs of diverse segments of the population; that 
benefits are not denied on the basis of disability, dependency, life expectancy, or quality 
of life; and that access to emergency care is not limited by a prior approval requirement, 
or to providers with in-network status, or by cost-sharing for out-of-network emergency 
care providers that exceeds that imposed for in-network care.127 Out-of-pocket 
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expenditures cannot exceed the limit set for health savings account–linked high-
deductible health plans for 2014. This limit increase annually thereafter in accordance 
with the rate of growth of health insurance premiums.128 Deductibles in the small-group 
market cannot exceed $2,000 for single individuals and $4,000 for families.129 States may 
require qualified health plans to provide additional benefits, but only if the state assumes 
the cost of those benefits for persons eligible for premium assistance credits or cost-
sharing reduction payments.130
 
Self-insured ERISA plans and insured large-group plans are not required to cover 
essential benefits. They must, however, comply with the limits on cost-sharing.131 
Section 1562, “Conforming Amendments,” adds a new section 715 to ERISA, stating that 
all of the new health insurance regulatory provisions that the reform bill adds to Part A of 
title XXVII of the Public Health Services Act apply to ERISA plans, except for those that 
do not apply. The provisions that explicitly do not apply include the sections requiring 
equity in insurance coverage regardless of salary in insured group plans and the provision 
requiring minimum loss ratios, but other provisions that apply only to “health insurance 
issuers” would also seem not to apply to self-insured plans. 
 
In any event, it is fair to say that qualified health plans must meet significantly 
more rigorous requirements than those applied to “minimum essential coverage.” 
Although qualified health plans may apparently be marketed outside the exchange, 
coverage sold outside the exchange does not have to comply with the qualified health 
plan requirements. This discrepancy enables healthy individuals or small employers to 
purchase minimum coverage outside the exchange, and may result in significant adverse 
selection against the exchange. Self-insured plans are subject to even less-rigorous 
requirements, leaving open the possibility of employer coverage that is substantially less 
protective than exchange coverage. 
 
7. How do the exchanges make health plan coverage more transparent? 
 
HOUSE. Under the House bill, the Commissioner is charged with developing standard 
definitions of insurance and medical terms and standards for disclosure of information by 
health plans.132 Under section 233, the primary transparency provision of the bill, 
exchange-participating health benefit plans must disclose to the Commissioner and to the 
public, in an accurate and timely manner and in plain language, their plan documents; 
plan terms and conditions; claims payment policies and practices; financial data; 
enrollment, disenrollment, claim denial, and rating practices data; and information on 
cost-sharing and out-of-network coverage.133 Employment-based health plans must 
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disclose to their participants the terms and conditions of the plan and financial 
information.134 Plans are also required to disclose information on enrollee and participant 
rights, as well as, in a timely manner on request, information sufficient to allow 
individuals to determine the amount of cost-sharing they will be responsible for with 
respect to the furnishing of an item or service by a participating providers, through the 
Internet or otherwise.135 Health plans are also required to ensure transparency of their 
payment arrangements to providers.136 The House bill further requires pharmaceutical 
benefit managers to disclose to health plans and to the Commissioner information on the 
cost and volume of drugs, including generic usage, switching, etc., but this information is 
not available to the public except in aggregate form.137 Section 234 provides that the 
transparency requirements imposed by section 233 apply outside the exchange only to the 
extent specified by the Commissioner. 
 
Additional disclosure provisions are found elsewhere in the House bill. Section 
215(b) requires health plans to list providers who participate in their networks on their 
own Web site and on the exchange’s Web site. The Commissioner must establish an 
online system for consumers to identify the insurer networks in which providers 
participate. Section 217 requires health plans to give 90 days’ notice of coverage 
decreases or cost-sharing increases. Section 309 provides that purchasers of insurance 
sold under interstate compacts must be told that the policy may not be subject to all 
insurance laws and regulations of the state in which they reside. The House bill requires 
that exchanges and exchange-qualified insurers communicate in a culturally and 
linguistically appropriate manner.138
 
SENATE. Section 1001 (creating §2715 of the Public Health Services Act) requires the 
Secretary of HHS, in consultation with NAIC and others, to develop standards for 
compiling and providing a summary of benefits and coverage explanation for group 
health plans (including self-insured plans and grandfathered plans created after the 
effective date of the legislation) and health insurance issuers (inside and outside the 
exchange). The standards must provide for a summary of benefits that: 
• is in a standard format, with no more than four pages and no smaller than  
12-point type 
• is culturally and linguistically appropriate and in easily understandable language 
• uses uniform definitions of standard insurance and medical terms (to be 
developed by HHS) 
• includes a description of coverage, including cost-sharing 
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• lists exceptions, reductions, and limitations on coverage for all essential services 
and other benefits 
• includes cost-sharing provisions and renewability and continuation of  
coverage terms 
• includes a “coverage facts label” that illustrates common benefit scenarios, such 
as pregnancy or serious chronic illness 
• states whether the plan provides minimum essential coverage (meeting the 
individual mandate’s requirements) or ensures that an employer plan provides not 
less than 60 percent of allowed benefits (and thus is adequate to keep employees 
from opting for the exchange instead of employer coverage) 
• includes a statement that the coverage outline is just a summary and that the 
coverage document itself is the real contract, as well as a contact telephone 
number to ask additional questions and a Web address where the contract itself 
can be found 
 
Plans must provide the summary of benefits and coverage explanation to 
applicants, enrollees, and policy holders. Enrollees are entitled to 60 days’ notice of 
modification of plan terms. Plans that fail to provide required information are subject to a 
fine of $1,000 for each enrollee to whom the information was not provided. The 
requirements preempt any state standards that require less disclosure. 
 
The Manager’s Amendment imposes on plans seeking exchange certification 
significant new disclosure requirements that are very similar to those found in the House 
bill, including disclosure of claims payment policies and practices, periodic financial 
disclosures, disclosure of data on enrollment and disenrollment, disclosure of data on 
claims denials and rating practices, disclosure of information on cost-sharing for out-of-
network coverage and on enrollees’ and participants’ rights, and disclosure of “other 
information as determined appropriate” by HHS.139 Exchange plans are also required to 
provide additional information on cost-sharing with respect to specific services from 
specific providers if an enrollee requests it. 
 
Additional disclosure provisions elsewhere in the Senate bill include the 
following: 
• Health insurance issuers and HHS will post on their Web sites information about 
premium increases and justifications for those increases.140 
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• HHS will establish a Web site on which will be posted comparative information 
about insurers, including medical loss ratios, eligibility, availability, premium 
rates, and cost-sharing, consistent with the standards described above.141 
• Group health plans and insurance issuers will report to HHS and to enrollees on 
programs designed to improve health outcomes, reduce hospital readmissions, 
implement patient safety and error reduction programs, and promote prevention 
and wellness (HHS is to post these reports on a Web site).142 
• Insurance issuers will report the proportion of their total premium revenue spent 
on clinical services, activities to improve health care quality, and other non-claim 
costs (excluding taxes, and fees). HHS will post the reports on the Internet.143 
 
Exchanges are required to rate plans based on quality and price and to make that 
information available to the public. Exchanges and qualified health plans are also charged 
with providing standardized information found in the uniform outline of coverage 
described above to allow consumers to compare plans.144 Exchange-based plans must 
also provide information on the availability of in-network and out-of-network 
providers.145
 
The Senate bill repeatedly emphasizes that information must be made available in 
a culturally and linguistically appropriate manner so that all health plan enrollees or 
potential enrollees can benefit from the information.146
 
8. Can agents and brokers collect commissions for exchange policies? 
 
HOUSE. The bill preserves a role for agents and brokers in enrolling individuals and 
employers through the exchange.147
 
SENATE. Agents and brokers may assist individuals and small groups in enrolling in 
qualified health plans and applying for premium tax credits and cost-sharing 
reductions.148 The original bill permitted HHS to establish a brokerage commission 
schedule, but this provision was eliminated by the Manager’s Amendment 
 
9. How is enrollment handled through the exchange? 
 
HOUSE. The exchange offers open enrollment once a year and special enrollment 
periods for special circumstances.149 Individuals who receive subsidies and who do not 
otherwise enroll in plans are automatically enrolled in a plan.150 The Commissioner is 
responsible for disseminating information to potential enrollees and assisting with 
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choice.151 Premiums are paid directly to plans.152 The bill also includes a program 
offering small businesses counseling and technical assistance in providing insurance to 
their employees through the exchange.153
 
SENATE. The basic function of exchanges is to assist individuals and employees of 
participating employers in enrolling in qualified health plans.154 Exchanges offer annual 
open enrollment periods and special enrollment periods under particular 
circumstances.155 Exchanges are also responsible for enrolling eligible individuals in 
Medicaid, CHIP, or any other available state or local public programs.156 The bill 
provides start-up funding for state consumer assistance offices and insurance ombudsmen 
who will be assisting consumers in health plan enrollment.157 It also requires exchanges 
to contract with “navigators,” organizations that can help inform the public about the 
availability of qualified health plans and financial assistance, and can help enroll 
individuals in qualified plans.158
 
10. Does the exchange administer a risk-adjustment program? Does a risk-adjustment 
program reach outside the exchange? 
 
HOUSE. The bill provides for risk pooling through risk-adjusting premiums for plans 
within the exchange.159 Risk adjustment only takes place within the exchange. 
 
SENATE. The bill includes three risk-adjustment programs. The first is a permanent 
program to be administered by the states.160 This program covers health plans inside and 
outside the exchange, but not self-insured or grandfathered plans. The state will assess a 
charge on plans and insurers with low-risk enrollees and make payments to plans and 
insurers with high-risk enrollees. The second program included in the bill is a transitional 
reinsurance program to be implemented by the states for 36 months, from 2014 to 2016, 
under contracts with private reinsurers.161 This program collects funds from health 
insurers and group health plans (through their administrators) and provides payments to 
insurers in the individual market for individuals with specific high-risk medical 
conditions. Third will be a risk corridor program, available during 2014–2016, for 
qualified health plans in the individual and small-group market.162 This plan is a mystery 
in that it contemplates payment of premiums to the plans by HHS, which the legislation 
does not provide for (other than premium and cost-sharing subsidies). One wonders 
whether this provision got lost in the wrong bill. 
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11. Are subsidies available outside the exchange? 
 
HOUSE. Affordability credits are distributed through the exchange.163
 
SENATE. Premium assistance credits and cost-sharing reduction payments are available 
only for individuals enrolled in qualified health plans through exchanges.164
 
12) Does the exchange play a role in the individual or employer mandate? 
 
HOUSE. No. 
 
SENATE. The exchange certifies that individuals are exempt from the mandate when no 
affordable qualified health plan is available to them through the exchange or when they 
meet other mandate exemptions.165
 
13. Must the exchange accept all insurers that wish to sell policies through it? Can the 
exchange negotiate with insurers (and over what)? 
 
HOUSE. Exchanges are apparently not required to accept all qualified plans.166 They can 
solicit bids and negotiate with entities offering plans. The federal acquisition regulations 
do not apply. 
 
SENATE. Exchanges are responsible for certifying qualified health plans to enroll 
members through the exchange. To certify a plan, the exchange must determine that the 
plan meets all requirements of the exchange and “that making available such health plan 
through such Exchange is in the interests of the qualified individuals and qualified 
employers in the State or States in which such Exchange operates.”167 As noted above, 
the exchange must take into account unjustified or excessive premium increases in 
making this determination, although it cannot regulate premiums directly. 
 
14. How is the exchange related to the public plan? 
 
HOUSE. The public plan is offered through the exchange only.168
 
SENATE. The Senate bill no longer includes a public plan. In the place of the public plan 
is a new program of “multistate plans” to be supervised by the Office of Personnel 
Management, which administers the Federal Employees Health Benefit Program.169 At 
least two of the multistate plans are to be available in every state and at least one of these 
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must be nonprofit. The OPM is responsible for negotiating with these plans concerning 
medical loss ratios, profits, premiums, and other relevant terms and conditions. 
 
The plans are supposed to be nationwide — initially covering at least 60 percent 
of the states, and, within four years, all of them. The plans must be licensed in every state 
in which they do business and must comply with state law, including state age premium-
rating requirements more restrictive than the 3-to-1 ratio found in the Senate bill. They 
must also offer the essential benefit package and comply with all other requirements of 
the federal statute. States may require the plans to provide additional benefits, but then 
must pay for any additional premium subsidies. The program is to be kept completely 
separate from the FEHBP and will not adversely affect the operation of that program. 
 
15. What are the enforcement responsibilities of the exchange? 
 
HOUSE. The Commissioner provides a grievance and complaint mechanism.170 The 
Commissioner can apply intermediate sanctions to insurers within the exchange or 
terminate the participation of insurers.171
 
SENATE. States are responsible for certifying, recertifying, and decertifying plans for 
participation in exchanges172 They could presumably, therefore, decertify noncompliant 
plans. 
 
16. What remedies are available for persons or entities adversely affected by  
exchange decisions? 
 
HOUSE. There are no remedies explicitly available to individuals. A sanctioned insurer 
has the opportunity to submit a corrective action plan and receive notice and the 
opportunity for a hearing and an appeal of the initial decision before termination, except 
where there is an imminent and serious risk to health.173
 
SENATE. There are no provisions in the Senate bill for health insurers to appeal or 
challenge determinations that their plans are not qualified. The bill provides for the 
determination and redetermination of eligibility for individuals for premium and cost-
sharing subsidies.174 HHS is charged with providing for procedures for resolving 
eligibility appeals.175 Exchanges are responsible for notifying individuals of the 
availability of these processes.176 No provision is made for judicial review of eligibility 
determinations, although it would presumably be available under the Administrative 
Procedures Act or the Due Process Clause. 
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17. How is the exchange funded? 
 
HOUSE. The exchange is financed by a trust fund to which money is appropriated 
equivalent to the taxes collected under the bill from individuals who do not obtain or 
employers who do not provide coverage or pay for acceptable coverage, to be 
supplemented with other appropriations as necessary.177 States that operate exchanges 
must provide matching funds.178
 
SENATE. The federal government will initially appropriate funds to assist the states in 
starting exchanges, but those funds will not be available after 2014.179 After January 1, 
2015, exchanges will be self-funding, most likely through user charges imposed  
on insurers.180
 
POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY THE LEGISLATION 
The two bills represent quite different understandings of what an exchange is, what it 
does, how it is organized, and how it functions. Those differences are likely to determine 
the extent to which the exchanges will accomplish their goals and whether they will avoid 
the problems that have afflicted earlier attempts at creating and operating exchanges. 
These issues will be discussed next.181
 
Federal and State Relations 
The first, and perhaps ultimately most important, issue is whether the exchange is 
implemented at the federal or at the state level. Under the House bill, the federal 
government is responsible for forming the exchange, although the Commissioner of 
Health Choices can allow a state that meets specific criteria to form its own exchange. 
Under the Senate bill, the states are responsible for establishing exchanges, although the 
federal government can itself establish an exchange or contract with a nonprofit entity to 
do so in a state that fails or refuses to act. 
 
The health reform legislation will be a federal law addressing problems that are 
national in scope. Americans throughout the country lack access to health care and are 
struggling with high and rapidly rising health care costs. Congress is attempting to 
address the problem by creating a national solution that will help all Americans. 
Consequently, there is a certain logic to having a national rather than a state-based 
exchange. 
 
There are, moreover, good policy arguments for establishing an exchange at the 
national level. Most importantly, the exchange is being created under federal law, will be 
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carrying out functions specified by federal law, will be administering federal premium 
subsidies, and will initially receive federal start-up funds. As we have learned from our 
experience with Medicaid, HIPAA, and other programs, state implementation of a federal 
program is at best awkward, at worst ineffectual.182 Under our constitutional system, the 
federal government cannot “commandeer” state government for its purposes. To secure 
state cooperation in implementing a program, the federal government must use either the 
carrot of federal funds (as with Medicaid) or the stick of threatening to implement a 
federal fallback program in states that refuse to implement the mandated program 
themselves. In either event, the federal government ends up attempting to regulate a co-
sovereign, an uncomfortable position to be in. It is particularly difficult when large sums 
of money are flowing from the federal government to the states, as could be the case with 
premium subsidies, creating a tempting pool for the states to use for their own purposes. 
This scenario has been a continuing source of friction in the Medicaid program. 
 
On the other hand, there are also arguments for implementing the exchange at the 
state level. States have more experience with insurance regulation than does the federal 
government. Some states have even experience with forming and operating purchasing 
cooperatives (although, on the whole, that experience has not been positive, as noted 
above) and others operate their public employee health benefit programs through an 
exchange. Under each of the bills, the exchange has some regulatory functions and, in 
any event, will need to coordinate its activities with state regulators. Insurance is 
currently marketed primarily at the state or substate regional level, and many insurance 
products (including most HMOs) are likely to continue to be state-specific. The use of 
state-level exchanges would provide opportunities for experimentation with a variety of 
models and for learning from that experience. Some states would likely be more creative 
and protective of consumers in implementing the exchanges than the federal government 
is likely to be. State-level exchanges would be “closer to the ground,” making them 
perhaps more responsive to individuals who would be purchasing insurance and receiving 
credits through them. 
 
But the states’ advantage in expertise over the federal government may be 
exaggerated. In fact, the three largest “exchanges” in the country—the Federal Employee 
Health Benefits Program, the Medicare Advantage program, and the Medicare Part D 
drug program—are run by the federal government. The federal government has also long 
been primarily responsible under ERISA for regulating employee benefit plans, the 
largest source of health insurance in the country. The federal government routinely takes 
the lead in other areas where it partners with state governments, as in fraud and abuse 
prevention, or in regulating the Medicare Advantage program, where insurers must be 
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licensed by the states. While the states at present are primarily in charge of insurance 
regulation, the quality of their enforcement efforts varies greatly, with some doing a 
clearly inadequate job.183 The move toward nullification of health care reform in a 
number of states indicates that some states are not eager to be willing partners in that 
reform with the federal government.184 Finally, the House bill allows truly innovative 
states to initiate their own exchanges with federal permission, providing the benefits of 
both a federal floor and state innovation. 
 
There is also the problem of geographic coverage. Health insurance is sold in 
local markets. Many Americans live in local markets that span two or more states. Many 
Americans who work for firms that provide insurance through an exchange find that they 
live in one state and their employer’s business is in another. Other Americans live part of 
the year in one state and part in another, or have children who are in college in another 
state. Through which exchange will these households purchase insurance and receive a 
subsidy? Will a state-based exchange be able to meet all their needs? Moreover, in a large 
state like California or Texas, exchanges will still be offering different products in 
different parts of the state, and a state exchange will hold little comparative advantage 
over a federal exchange. 
 
One solution to consider is a nationally administered plan, offering insurance 
products that vary by locality, operating primarily through a Web-based portal or over the 
telephone, but with representation perhaps in local social security or state Medicaid 
offices for those who need personal consultation. It is also likely under a national plan 
that insurance agents and brokers would remain involved in purchasing decisions, thus 
providing another local portal, although hopefully their commissions would be reduced 
along with their role. 
 
Alternatively, state implementation closely monitored by Congress could be a 
solution. Congress could require HHS to report annually on the progress of the individual 
states toward implementation and semiannually on its own response in states that 
declined to establish exchanges or did so inadequately. Congress would then have a much 
better sense of how implementation was proceeding and whether midcourse corrections 
were needed. 
 
In any event, the question of federal versus state-based exchanges will certainly 
prove to be one of the most controversial issues to be resolved in the projected 
House/Senate conference committee. 
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Protection Against Adverse Selection 
The Achilles’ heel of many earlier attempts at health insurance exchanges has been 
adverse selection against the exchange. As long as insurers can sell their products outside 
the exchange, they can siphon off good risks from the exchange, leaving the exchange 
with high-risk individuals and groups and high prices. Even if this scenario does not 
occur initially, insurers may be reluctant to sell their products through the exchange for 
fear that they will end up with bad risks. Another particular problem has been agents and 
brokers who steer their customers away from the exchange because they can make higher 
commissions for sales outside it. 
 
One obvious solution to the adverse selection problem is to allow insurers to sell 
their products only through the exchange, as the House bill does with individual policies, 
although it allows employment-related groups eligible for the exchange to purchase 
outside the exchange as well. The Senate bill allows insurers to sell their products both 
inside and outside the exchange in both the individual and small-group market. Both bills 
allow grandfathered policies to continue to be sold outside the exchange. Respecting 
grandfathered coverage is apparently based on the legislation’s promise that, if you like 
the insurance you have, you can keep it. 
 
Measures can be taken, however, to address the adverse selection problem and 
still preserve a market outside the exchange. First, the larger the pool covered by the 
exchange, the more likely it is to combine good and bad risks. Both the House and Senate 
bills limit the use of premium and affordability subsidies to the exchange. This restriction 
in itself should create a sizable market for insurance within the exchange. Moreover, 
although each of the bills starts with covering individuals and small groups, each also 
contemplates eventually expanding the exchange’s coverage to include larger employers. 
But even large exchanges can be victims of adverse selection if they end up attracting 
higher-risk individuals and groups, especially if they enroll them in large numbers. 
 
If exchanges are created on a state-by-state basis, there is a risk that some smaller 
states may not have large enough risk pools. A recent paper from the Committee for 
Economic Development, authored by Alain Enthoven and others, asserts that the 
minimum size for a stable risk pool is 100,000, and that some state exchanges will 
probably not achieve that size.185 The authors of the study also contend that what is 
important is not only the size of the exchange, but also the percentage of the private 
market that the exchange includes. They assert that “each exchange should have a 
minimum participant pool of at least 20 to 25 percent of non-Medicaid/non-Medicare 
population in its coverage area.”186 The minimum percentage of population is important 
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not only to address adverse selection, but also to make certain that private insurers see the 
risk pool as large enough to justify their participation in it. By this reasoning, not only 
should all enrollees in the nongroup market be required to participate in it, as in the 
House bill, but all small groups should be required to participate as well, and the 
exchange should be opened to larger groups. 
 
Adverse selection can also be limited if plans both inside and outside the 
exchange that cover the same markets have to play by the same rules. With few 
exceptions, the House bill applies the same coverage and cost-sharing rules to individual 
and small-employer plans inside and outside the exchange, thus making it more difficult 
for insurers to sell cheaper low-coverage policies outside the exchange. The Senate bill, 
on the other hand, permits “minimum essential coverage” plans to exist outside the 
exchange in the individual and small-group markets, increasing the risk of adverse 
selection. The Senate bill does, however, require individual and small-group non-
exchange plans to cover the same essential benefits as plans sold through the exchange, 
all individuals within and outside the exchange to be treated as if they were in a single 
risk pool, all small groups inside and outside the exchange also to be treated as a single 
risk pool (with a state option to combine the risk pools), and all insurers within and 
outside the exchange to charge the same premium for a qualified health plan. These 
provisions should help considerably in combating adverse selection, although they may 
be difficult to enforce outside the exchange. 
 
Another tool for combating adverse selection is risk adjustment. If insurers that 
attract good risks have to compensate insurers who end up with bad risks, the incentive to 
select risk is reduced. Risk reallocation schemes are common in insurance regulation and 
have generally been upheld against constitutional challenges as long as the scheme is 
established prospectively. 
 
The House bill provides only for risk adjustment within the exchange, and so will 
do little to protect exchanges from adverse selection. The Senate bill provides for risk 
reallocation both within and outside the exchange and thus could make a substantial 
contribution to addressing the risk selection problem. Indeed, the Senate bill provides for 
three risk reallocation schemes, one permanent and two temporary. 
 
It is, however, difficult to see how the Senate schemes are going to work. Risk 
reallocation is not easy, and requires the collection and analysis of a great deal of data if 
it is to be successful. Collecting that data outside the exchange is going to be difficult. 
Moreover, the mechanism through which risk reallocation is accomplished outside the 
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exchange is not clear. The Senate risk corridor provision, for example, calls for risk 
adjustment of premiums. Within the exchange, payments from affordability subsidies can 
be adjusted to compensate for risk. Outside the exchange, however, the government has 
nothing to do with the payment of premiums, so it is not clear how premiums will be 
adjusted. Of course, funds can be transferred from insurers with low-risk insureds to 
those with high-risk insureds retroactively, which is apparently what the permanent risk-
adjustment scheme in the Senate bill contemplates. This will require, however, a fairly 
intrusive level of insurance regulation. 
 
Finally, regulation can be used to discourage employers or insurers from steering 
bad risks into the exchange. The House bill requires the Commissioner to develop 
standards to determine whether employers or insurers are taking actions to affect the risk 
pool by inducing individuals to decline coverage under a plan offered by the employer 
and instead enter the exchange.187 It is not clear what sanctions will be imposed if 
steering is uncovered. 
 
The easiest solution to the adverse selection problem is to make the purchase of 
insurance through the exchange mandatory for all individuals and small groups that are 
eligible for it, as the House bill does with the individual market. Failing that, what may 
work is some combination of uniform benefits, single risk pools, uniform prices, risk 
reallocation inside and outside the exchange, and regulation. The Senate bill includes a 
number of provisions to establish uniformity inside and outside the exchange. Its risk-
adjustment mechanism, however, may prove difficult to implement. 
 
Standardization and Transparency 
An important potential benefit of exchanges is that they make insurance plans more 
standardized and transparent, thus enabling consumers to make more informed choices 
and promoting head-to-head competition among plans. The House and Senate bills both 
do a reasonably good job of standardizing plans. Both require plans sold within the 
exchange to cover essential benefits, limit cost-sharing (albeit at very high levels), 
exclude (or restrict) annual or lifetime limits, and provide an opportunity to appeal 
coverage decisions. Each bill also standardizes and specifies tiers of coverage defined by 
actuarial value (in effect, levels of cost-sharing) into which plans must fit, thus 
facilitating comparison of plans by purchasers. The House bill also largely standardizes 
plans both inside and outside the exchange. The Senate bill does so less clearly, but does 
require individual and small group plans both within and outside the exchange to provide 
the same essential benefits and observe the same limits on cost-sharing. 
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Both bills also include provisions that should make plan coverage more 
transparent. Both, for example, require the disclosure of information about premiums, 
cost-sharing, network providers, benefits, and other issues of concern to consumers. The 
Senate bill, described above, offers a particularly detailed and creative approach to 
transparency. It requires the exchanges to rate plans for cost, quality, and price and to 
describe each insurance plan using standard defined terms in a four-page summary 
description, and requires plans to provide model scenarios describing coverage and cost-
sharing for particular medical conditions. Both bills require culturally and linguistic 
appropriate communications, an issue that becomes ever more important as our country 
becomes more ethnically diverse. Either bill would be a great advance in transparency 
and disclosure beyond what is currently available in most states. 
 
While transparency of information about plan performance is important, so also is 
the privacy of information that exchanges possess concerning their participants. There is 
nothing readily visible in the House or Senate bill that protects the confidentiality of 
personally identifiable information held by exchanges, and it is not clear that existing 
privacy law would protect that information.188 This issue should be addressed, probably 
through an amendment to the HIPAA privacy statute or regulations to make exchanges 
“covered entities.” 
 
Reducing Administrative Costs 
Part of the promise of exchanges is that they can reduce administrative costs, making 
health insurance more affordable and accessible. In principle, that goal is attainable. 
Large-group employer plans have much lower administrative costs than small-group 
plans, which in turn have lower administrative costs than are found in the nongroup 
market. Exchanges create large purchasing pools within the nongroup and small-group 
market, which should offer some efficiencies. Administrative costs are a significant 
factor in health insurance markets, and controlling them could be a major contribution of 
reforms. 
 
Exchanges themselves cost money, however. The Senate bill provides for 
surcharges on insurers to fund exchanges. The House bill would fund the exchanges from 
the excise taxes received from individuals or employers who fail to comply with 
coverage mandates, and from additional appropriations. The exchanges reduce overall 
costs, therefore, only if these added expenses are offset by savings elsewhere. 
 
The risk-underwriting and rating reforms in the bill generally should reduce 
administrative costs, both inside and outside the exchange. Enrollment in health plans 
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through the exchange could reduce the cost to health plans of enrolling members, while 
information transmitted through the exchange could reduce marketing costs. However, as 
long as an exchange has only a small market share it is unlikely to achieve significant 
administrative cost savings because insurers are likely to continue their current functions, 
largely duplicating exchange functions. If an exchange could achieve sufficient market 
share, on the other hand, it might reduce the administrative costs of insurers, thus 
reducing the overall costs of health insurance coverage. 
 
A significant opportunity to reduce health insurance administrative costs might be 
found in reducing brokerage commissions. Brokerage commissions consume from 2 to 8 
percent of the premiums of group plans and a much higher percentage of premiums in the 
nongroup market.189 Although brokers may still have a useful role in serving employers 
as benefit consultants, they would seem to be redundant in the nongroup market with the 
presence of the exchange, and unnecessary for individual employees who enroll in 
insurance through the exchange. Eliminating their commissions could result in substantial 
cost reductions for the health care system overall. 
 
Both the House and the Senate bill retain brokerage commissions. The Senate bill 
would have permitted HHS to establish a schedule for brokerage commissions, but that 
provision was eliminated by the Manager’s Amendment. Insurance brokers are an 
extraordinarily powerful group politically, and they can be counted on to protect their 
privileges. Moreover, as long as insurance exists outside of the exchange, brokers can 
steer business away from it. Massachusetts was unable to eliminate brokers from the 
Connector. 
 
Finally, one of the surest paths to reducing the administrative costs of operating 
the exchange itself would seem to be a single national exchange like that provided for in 
the House bill. Operating 50 or more state exchanges would likely result in duplication of 
effort and wasted resources. Moreover, a single national exchange could provide for 
greater uniformity of regulation, which should in turn lead to more streamlined and 
efficient enforcement. 
 
Appeals and Judicial Review 
As described in the House and Senate bills, exchanges could make a host of 
determinations affecting individuals and other entities, including: 
• whether, and to what extent, individuals qualify for an affordability subsidy 
• whether individuals cease to qualify for a subsidy when their incomes increase 
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• whether individuals are liable for refunding an excessive or improperly  
paid subsidy 
• whether individuals or employers are qualified to participate in an exchange 
• whether insurers are qualified to participate in the exchange or have complied 
with other statutory requirements 
 
Health plans that market their services through an exchange will additionally need 
to determine: 
• whether individuals are covered for services by a private plan participating in an 
exchange (gateway) or by the public plan 
• whether individuals have met the cost-sharing requirements of a private plan 
participating in an exchange (gateway) or of the public plan 
 
Finally, under the Senate legislation, the federal government will need to 
determine whether states are properly enforcing federal law or operating an exchange. 
 
The exchanges can help facilitate appeals, perhaps even decide them in some 
instances. They can also make a valuable contribution by simply correcting errors and 
clearing up misunderstandings. Depending on how the exchange is set up, it could play 
an ombudsman role (although both the House and the Senate bill provide independently 
for an insurance ombudsman).190
 
The bills do a pretty good job of addressing remedies for individuals affected by 
health plan decisions. Both the House and the Senate bill require internal and external 
review procedures, and the House bill preserves state judicial review of claims appeals 
and grievances. The bills are less generous, however, with provision for the appeal of the 
decisions of exchanges themselves. The House bill provides appeal rights for plans 
terminated from exchanges, while the Senate bill provides for appeals by persons denied 
affordability subsidies. Neither of the bills mentions judicial review for these decisions. 
Each of these determinations probably involves a property or liberty interest protected by 
the Due Process clause, but an explicit provision for review would be helpful. 
 
The Senate legislation largely delegates to the states the tasks of running the 
exchanges and enforcing the insurance reforms. Presumably the decisions of the states 
are subject to review under state administrative law and state judicial review procedures, 
and state hearing officers and courts would apply the federal law in reviewing decisions. 
But each state will have different procedures and afford different levels of protection to 
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appellants. And if each state comes up with a different interpretation of the law, it will be 
difficult to reconcile the varying approaches. 
 
It would be helpful if Congress would specify appeal and review procedures now 
rather than being required to do so later by the courts. This step is particularly important, 
because if Congress wrote these appeal and judicial review provisions into the bill it 
could specifically mark certain legislative determinations as not subject to judicial 
review—such as the level of subsidies or the definition of affordability—as it now 
routinely does when establishing Medicare prospective payment systems.191
 
Cost Control 
One of the primary justifications for creating exchanges is that they will help moderate 
health insurance premium increases. They could do so through increased competition 
among health plans brought about by greater comparability and transparency. Exchanges 
might also bring down administrative costs. A final function of an exchange could be to 
try to reduce the cost of insurance through regulation or through negotiations. 
 
Neither of the bills gives the exchanges the authority to set insurance prices. Both 
bills impose mandatory minimum medical loss ratio requirements, although they are not 
enforced through the exchanges.192 But the House bill also requires the exchange to 
negotiate contracts with qualified plans, and price could certainly be an issue subject to 
negotiation. The Senate bill does not explicitly provide for negotiations, but does require 
the exchange to certify that making available a plan offered by an insurer is in the interest 
of individuals and employers before offering it through the exchange. The bill also, as 
modified by the Manager’s Amendment, requires the exchanges to “take into account” 
excessive or unjustified premium increases in deciding whether to certify a health plan 
for exchange participation.193
 
An exchange containing all purchasers in the nongroup market and eventually 
many employees of firms that now purchase insurance in the group market (or that do not 
currently insure their employees) could be attractive to insurers willing to trade price for 
volume. If the exchange offered plans from only a handful of insurers, it might be able to 
insist on substantial discounts.194
 
The key to cost control here is competition from a strong public plan. In many 
markets, one or a handful of insurers control an overwhelming share of the market, and 
an exchange offers little potential for creating competition without new entrants.195 If one 
of the competitors offered by the exchange is a public plan paying lower prices to 
 33
providers than private plans and minimizing administrative costs, private plans in the 
exchange would face a strong incentive to bring down their own provider payments and 
administrative costs. If not, the experience of previous exchanges—minimal cost 
control—may again be replicated. At this point, however, a strong public plan seems very 
unlikely to be part of the final legislation. The Senate multistate plan provision is unlikely 
to create additional competition, since most of the plans that participate will already be 
offering insurance through the exchanges.196
 
There should be no constitutional impediment to negotiations between an 
exchange and insurers as long as efficient insurers are allowed to make a fair and 
reasonable return. If an exchange attempted to force an insurer to forego a fair and 
reasonable return in order to be included in an exchange, the insurer could raise a due 
process or takings challenge. Such a challenge would be less likely to succeed if the 
insurer could continue to sell policies in the state outside the exchange. Even if all 
insurers were required to sell through the exchange, as is true in the individual market in 
the House bill, the exchange could negotiate for cost control if the insurer were still 
permitted to make a fair and reasonable return on its investment. Indeed, following the 
precedent set by state certificate-of-need programs, the exchange could conceivably 
restrict the market to a limited number of low-cost or high-value insurers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Over the next days and weeks, Congress will in all likelihood finalize legislation that will 
significantly change the way in which we finance health care in the United States. The 
health insurance exchange concept will almost certainly play a role in this reform. A 
robust health insurance exchange holds real promise as a tool for advancing the goals of 
affordability and comprehensive coverage, but to realize that promise Congress must 
heed the lessons learned from the failed designs of previous exchanges. Specifically, 
Congress must ensure that the risk pool in the exchange is large and diverse and must 
take strong measures to suppress adverse selection and the steering of bad risk into the 
exchange. The easiest solution to the adverse selection problem is to require all 
individuals and small groups that are eligible for insurance through the exchange to 
purchase only through the exchange, as the House bill does with the individual market. 
 
For the exchange to enable consumers to make informed choices, Congress must 
also ensure that consumers have accessible, reliable, linguistically accessible, and 
transparent information about the insurance plans in the exchange. Both the Senate and 
the House bill provisions would make important advances in transparency and disclosure 
of needed information concerning health plans, although the Senate bill, as amended, 
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offers a better approach. In addition, the final bill should address the need for the 
exchange to protect the confidentiality of personal identifiable information held by the 
exchange, perhaps by amending the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
to include exchanges as covered entities. 
 
Both the House and the Senate bill provide for consumers to appeal adverse 
health plan decisions; however, only the Senate bill provides for appeals by persons 
denied affordability subsidies. The final bill would be improved if Congress specified 
clear appeal and review procedures. 
 
Both the House and the Senate allow for a combination of state and federal roles 
in regulation of insurance and administration of the health insurance exchange. The 
House bill establishes a national responsibility on the part of the federal government but 
offers states with initiative and capacity the opportunity to take on the responsibility of 
forming and operating an exchange. In the Senate bill, states have the primary 
responsibility and the federal government has responsibility only when a state defaults on 
its presumptive obligation. While there are arguments for state-based exchanges, there 
are, on balance, better policy arguments for placing the primary responsibility for 
operating the exchange at the national level, as the House bill does. The House bill allows 
truly innovative states to initiate their own exchanges, allowing for the benefits of both 
national standards and state laboratories for creativity. A national exchange also is one of 
the surest paths to reducing the administrative costs of operating the exchange itself. The 
House provision, which requires the national exchange to negotiate contracts with 
qualified plans, has the potential to help moderate health insurance premiums and costs 
for both consumers and taxpayer-funded subsidies. The authority of the exchange to 
negotiate contracts with health insurance plans is particularly important and necessary 
should Congress opt not to include stronger cost controls such as a public plan option. 
 
As is almost always the case in public policy, the devil of implementing health 
insurance exchanges will be in the details of its design and function. The two bills 
enacted by the House and Senate contain a host of good ideas that Congress can work 
with in putting together a final bill. There is, however, much that could be improved. It is 
to be hoped that this analysis will prove useful in the pursuit of that goal. 
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